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Abstract
Economic research has developed estimates of the heterogeneity of the
value of statistical life (VSL) on dimensions such as individual age,
income, immigrant status, and the nature of the risk exposure. This
paper examines the empirical evidence on the heterogeneity of VSL
and explores the potential implications for the valuation of regulatory
policies. Previously, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
unsuccessfully sought to adopt a simple age discount percentage for
VSL based on survey evidence. However, labor market estimates of
VSL indicate a pattern that tracks lifetime consumption trajectories,
as the VSL rises with age and eventually tapers off but does not plum-
met with age. The VSL has an income elasticity of at least 0.5. The
analysis of age variations in VSL is accompanied by a review of the
value of statistical life year (VSLY) approach. The U.S. Department
* Preliminary versions of the paper were presented at the CREATE — DHS Conference,
Washington, D.C., September 23–24, 2010, and at the ALEA Conference in New York
City, May 20, 2011.
of Transportation recognizes the influence of a positive income elastic-
ity of VSL, and EPA has proposed adopting a 50% cancer premium.
Recent studies suggest that the risk of death from terrorist attacks are
of particular concern and may merit a substantial premium in benefit
assessments. Whether and how such heterogeneity in VSL should be
incorporated in regulatory policy evaluations depends in part on the
source of the heterogeneity. Some prominent sources of heterogeneity
arise from segmented labor markets in which disadvantaged groups face
different labor market opportunities. Blacks and Mexican immigrants
face quite different labor market offer curves. As a result, influences
that are problematic from the standpoint of setting different benefit
levels for policy purposes are differences in VSL by race and immigrant
status. The paper also examines the EPA’s recent devaluation of life
and the Posner–Sunstein proposal to use VSL estimates to set hedo-
nic damages in tort liability cases. As with hedonic damages generally,
adoption of their proposal would lead to excessive levels of compen-
satory damages and would greatly increase damage amounts.
Keywords: Value of statistical life, risk, regulation, hedonic damages.
JEL Codes: J17, I18, H40, K32
1
Introduction
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is the individual’s money-risk
tradeoff for small risks of death. This measure is the most prevalent
benefit assessment approach used by government agencies when valu-
ing changes in risk. The academic literature includes dozens of labor
market studies of VSL.1 There also have been studies of VSL based
on price-risk tradeoffs for the product market as well as VSL amounts
implied by risk-taking decisions ranging from the choice of highway
speed to the use of seat belts.
This paper focuses on the variation in VSL both across different
studies in the academic literature as well as in different policy con-
texts. These differences often reflect quite legitimate heterogeneity in
the valuation of risk. There are important differences in the VSL with
respect to individual risk-taking behaviors as well as personal character-
istics, including age, income, race, gender, and immigrant status. What
are these differences and what are the policy implications for benefit
1 For reviews, see Viscusi (1993), Viscusi and Aldy (2003), and Viscusi (2010), among others.
Robinson (2007), Graham (2008), and Viscusi (2009a) review related government agency
practices. Kniesner and Leeth (2009) review the underlying theory and econometric foun-
dations of this area of research.
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assessment? To assess such issues, I explore both the VSL estimates
themselves and their implications for the structure of labor markets.
The ramifications for labor market structure are not innocuous. To the
extent that there are segmented labor markets in which people face
different labor market opportunities, there will be differences across
the population in their estimated VSL. How and whether information
regarding the heterogeneity of VSL should be used depends on how the
differences arise.
My review of the academic literature is coupled with an examination
of the policy arena’s use of the VSL methodology. Government agencies
adopted the VSL approach to valuing risk regulations almost three
decades ago. The use of VSL estimates to value mortality risks has
continued through the recent controversies involving variations in VSL
levels with age and income. Other aspects of risk heterogeneity that
also are potentially prominent policy concerns and could affect the
application of VSL estimates include the size of the risk being reduced
and the context in which the risk arises. For example, is the risk a
voluntary risk, and is it being incurred in a market context in which
those exposed to the risk have endangered their lives by engaging in
reckless behavior?
As government agencies continue to refine their benefit assessment
procedure, the potential role of heterogeneity of VSL has moved to
the forefront of these debates. The U.S. Department of Transportation
(U.S. DOT, 2008) has adopted a positive income elasticity of VSL.
The income elasticity of VSL has also arisen as a component in pro-
posed congressional legislation that sought to incorporate a propor-
tional income elasticity of VSL that will apply only to increases in
income.2 Age variations in the VSL amount used in regulatory impact
analyses have been attempted and since abandoned in the United
States,3 but outside the United States the practice of varying VSL
by age has generated less of a controversy.4 More recently, the U.S.
2 The 2008 proposed legislation was the “Restoring the Value of Every American in Envi-
ronmental Decisions Act” (proposed in the 110th Congress, 2nd Session).
3 See Viscusi (2009a) for a review of the history of this episode.
4 The European Commission’s (2001) member countries use a VSL that declines with age,
and Canada has used a VSL involving a 25% discount for those over age 65. See Hara
Associates (2000).
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Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA, 2010) proposed a cancer
premium for VSL following a similar approach in the United Kingdom.
Other types of differentiation by type of risk exposure, such as ter-
rorism attacks, are also likely to gain policy prominence based on the
findings in the economics literature.
The VSL approach continues to remain controversial among non-
economists on normative grounds, as exemplified in the critique by
Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004). However, the policy alternative to
using VSL estimates has not been to use an infinite value of life but to
undervalue lives. In particular, early policy assessments used the eco-
nomic loss measures in tort damages contexts consisting of the present
value of lost earnings and medical expenses. Tort damages alone will
undervalue life compared to VSL estimates. There have also been recent
suggestions that court awarded compensation for wrongful death should
include both the VSL as well as the value of economic loss. One might
think that such a measure, if appropriate for compensatory damage
purposes, surely would be appropriate for regulatory analyses as well.
Whether this expansion of the use of the VSL concept in combina-
tion with economic loss amounts is appropriate is explored later in this
paper.
Assessments of VSL and heterogeneity in VSL levels are likely
to be increasingly important for policy decisions. For three decades
agencies have been required to show that all major new regulations
pass a benefit-cost test. In 2011, President Obama’s Executive Order
13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, reaffirmed the
objectives of the previous Executive Order 12866 and broadened the
regulatory review focus and the tests of economic merit to include
existing regulations. As a consequence, the range of policies for which
benefit-cost tests will be undertaken will continue to increase. That
development will bolster the policy role of VSL, which is the standard
governmental approach to monetizing mortality risks.
2
Calculating the Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
Because the VSL concept is so widely misunderstood, particularly by
critics of the approach, it is worthwhile to begin with the definition
of the concept.1 The VSL pertains to the tradeoff between money and
very small risks of death. In workplace contexts, it is the measure of
the average total compensation paid per expected fatality. Suppose
that there is a risk of one chance in 10,000 to 10,000 people so that
this group will experience one expected death. If each person would
be willing to pay $800 to eliminate the risk, the VSL in this instance
would be $8 million, or 10,000 people× $800 per person. This is the
amount that could be raised to prevent one expected death. The VSL
figure is not an accounting measure of the present value of one’s lost
earnings. It does not reflect the amount the person would be willing to
pay to avoid certain death or the amount that the person would need
to be compensated to accept certain death.
Although the VSL terminology is standard in the literature, the
U.S. EPA (2010, p. 60) has proposed using the terminology “value of
mortality risk (VMR), scaled to micro-risk reductions.” The economic
1 See Ackerman and Heinzerling (2004) for a recent example of such a critique.
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concept is unchanged, but their objective in adopting this more
unwieldy terminology is to decrease the political sensitivity of the
approach.
Although many studies have used survey methods to try to elicit
people’s risk-money tradeoff, the dominant approach in the economic
literature has been to analyze wage-risk tradeoffs. Examining how
workers in the labor market value risks offers the advantage of imput-
ing values from actual risk-taking decisions using large samples with
detailed data. Properly designed stated preference studies are a useful
supplementary technique for valuing many health risks, such as those
for which there is no market evidence, including various types of
cancer.
The basic idea underlying the theory of compensating wage differ-
entials can be traced back to Adam Smith’s theory of labor supply.
He theorized that workers would need to be paid more for jobs that are
risky or otherwise unpleasant. Two centuries later economists began
analyzing these premiums for risk and using these estimates to infer a
VSL. The empirical task is to control for the various characteristics of
the worker and the job and to isolate how much pay workers receive
for extra risk. This approach, which is known as a hedonic wage model,
utilizes a conceptual framework in which workers pick an optimal risk-
wage combination from the available set of opportunities in the labor
market. Based on these choices, it is possible to estimate the average
wage-risk tradeoff rate across the sample.
Figure 2.1 sketches the identical set of labor market opportunities
facing two different workers. The curve w(p) is the market opportuni-
ties locus for fatality risk p. It is the outer envelope of all the individual
firms’ offer curves, which indicate the highest wage the firm will offer
for any given risk. The envelope of such offer curves consequently rep-
resents the highest wage that is offered in the market for any given
fatality risk. Workers can choose any wage-risk combination that they
would like from this offer curve based on their own preferences.
Let u(w(p)) be the utility of income when healthy and v(w(p)) be
the utility of income if killed or injured on the job, where u′,v′ > 0
for any given w(p), and u′′,v′′ ≤ 0. Then, as shown in Viscusi (1978b,
1979) the observed wage-risk tradeoff based on the worker’s optimal











Fig. 2.1 The standard hedonic labor market model.
job choice from the set of available options is given by
wp =
u − v
(1 − p)uw + pvw . (2.1)
This equation plays such a fundamental role that it has been
“re-discovered” in dozens of subsequent articles. The left side of Equa-
tion (2.1) is the VSL for models in which p pertains to the probability
of death. The VSL equals the difference in utility levels between the
healthy and the ill health or dead state. These utility values are nor-
malized in Equation (2.1) by dividing by the expected marginal utility
of income. Empirical estimates usually trace out the average value of
wp across the working population using either the log hourly wage or
the wage rate as the dependent variable.
There are two workers shown in Figure 2.1. Each worker will choose
the wage-risk combination that offers the highest expected utility level
given his or her preferences. Worker 1 chooses fatality risk p1 that offers
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a wage rate of w1(p1). Worker 2 is willing to face a higher risk of p2 for
a wage w2(p2). The compensating differential that each worker receives
for risk is the difference between the wage the worker receives and the
value for a risk-free job given by w(0).
Conventional hedonic wage models fit a curve that passes through
these various points of tangency, thus simultaneously reflecting the
wage-risk tradeoff for both workers and firms. The median estimate
of studies using U.S. data is a VSL of $7 million ($2000) or $8.7 million
($2009) based on the meta analysis in Viscusi and Aldy (2003). Thus,
the average worker receives an additional $870 to face an annual job
fatality risk of 1/10,000. International studies likewise have indicated
the presence of compensating differentials in other markets as well.
Estimates from labor markets in foreign countries have produced VSL
levels in the expected range given that good health is a normal good so
that people are less willing to incur health risks as their income level
rises. For example, as one would expect, the labor market studies in
countries such as India have found a lower VSL than in the United
States where income levels are much higher. A review of the interna-
tional evidence is provided in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).
3
Heterogeneity of VSL Based on the Risk Level
As indicated by Figure 2.1, the wage-risk tradeoff for different workers
depends on where they settle along the market offer curve. Worker 1 is
on a steeper part of the curve than is Worker 2 and consequently has
revealed a higher VSL based on the local wage-risk tradeoff. Workers
who gravitate toward higher risk jobs such as those with the fatality
risk p2 have a lower VSL reflected in their choices.
This heterogeneity in the level of VSL based on the risk level makes
it possible to reconcile some of the early differences found in estimates
in the literature. For the estimates of the VSL by Thaler and Rosen
(1975), the average worker in the sample faced an annual job-related
fatality risk of 1/1,000, which is an extraordinarily large fatality risk.1
In contrast, the study by Viscusi (1978a,b, 1979) analyzed a more rep-
resentative group of workers who had fatality risks more in line with the
national average at that time, which was 1/10,000. Thus, the Thaler–
Rosen study focused on workers whose risk levels were about an order
1 Because their risk measure was based on life insurance data, it captured all mortality-
related differences by occupation rather than risks of the occupation per se. The subsequent




of magnitude greater than the U.S. average. The Thaler and Rosen
sample of workers had self-selected into very high-risk jobs and are con-
centrated on the right side of Figure 2.1. Not surprisingly, this focus
on workers in very high-risk jobs led to a comparatively low value for
VSL. The estimates in Viscusi (1978a, 1979) were five times greater
than those in the Thaler–Rosen analysis.2
What is interesting about these differences is that the disparate
VSL estimates do not arise because of a failure by economists to find
“the value of life number.” Rather, there is substantial heterogeneity
in VSL tradeoffs throughout the labor market, and this heterogene-
ity is reflected in the different studies. Which particular VSL number
emerges from the analysis depends in large part on the composition of
the sample and their concentration along the w(p) curve in Figure 2.1.
A major source of heterogeneity of risk preferences can be traced
to the risk levels people take as well as individual income levels. Thus,
people who gravitate to high-risk jobs are at the lower end of the income
distribution and have lower overall wage levels even including the influ-
ence of compensating differentials for risk. Using quantile regression
analyses and panel data, Kniesner et al. (2010) analyze how the VSL
varies across the wage distribution.3 People with higher overall levels
of wages and income sort themselves into the low-risk jobs and have
much higher levels of VSL. As shown by the first column of statistics
in Table 3.1, low-wage workers face more than double the fatality risk
of high-wage workers.
Whereas the VSL for low-wage workers is only $3.5 million, the
VSL at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution is $22.0 million
($2001).4 These results bolster the implications of the earlier compar-
ison of studies focusing on workers at quite different risk levels. The
VSL level differs markedly based on the risk level. Moreover, consider-
ation of the heterogeneity of VSL is not a minor footnote to the VSL
2 See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a tabulation of the different estimates. To this day, the
Thaler–Rosen estimates remain at the very low end of estimated values from the labor
market.
3 Quantile estimates of the wage-risk relation also appear in Evans and Schaur (2009).
4 These estimates using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) lead to higher levels
of VSL than after accounting for person-specific effects and other factors addressed using
the panel aspect of the data. See Kniesner et al. (2011).
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0.10 7.83 8.66 33,583 3.46 2.24
0.25 8.20 11.71 43,478 4.92 2.04
0.50 7.68 17.16 57,768 7.55 1.76
0.75 6.07 25.09 75,762 14.55 1.20
0.90 3.69 36.74 117,792 22.04 1.23
Source: Figures in this table are based on data in Kniesner et al. (2010).
literature but is a pivotal concern in determining which VSL is perti-
nent in any given context. This sorting based on the risk level is also
borne out in other risk-taking decisions. By matching individuals’ VSL
estimates to their decision to use automobile seatbelts, Hakes and Vis-
cusi (2007) found the expected relationship whereby those with a low
VSL were less likely to buckle up.
These results have more general implications for what one would
expect in terms of differences across the population. People who choose
very high-risk jobs, very risky products, or to live in very dangerous
neighborhoods have revealed themselves to have lower VSL levels than
the average person in society. They have money-risk tradeoff rates such
as those for workers located along the right side of the opportunities
locus in Figure 2.1. Thus, there is an important influence of selection on
job matches. Based on this selection, one can often infer that there are
fundamental differences in the risk-money tradeoffs that people are will-
ing to make. Similarly, people whose lives consistently reflect a strong
preference for safety are concentrated on the left side of Figure 2.1 and
have very steep wage-risk tradeoffs and a high VSL.
A key assumption in this analysis is that people select their job risk
based on the available market opportunities independent of the choices
of others. One might hypothesize, as some economists have done, that
people choose jobs to advance their relative economic position com-
pared to their peers by earning additional income through hazard pay.
Kniesner and Viscusi (2005) test this hypothesis and find no empirical
support for it. Moreover, while higher income may boost one’s status,




The canonical hedonic labor market model assumes that workers face
identical labor market offer curves such as w(p) shown in Figure 2.1.
However, Viscusi and Hersch (2001) hypothesize that workers may in
fact face different labor market offer curves and as a result settle into
separate labor market equilibria. Differences in offer curves with respect
to the vertical axis intercept for w(p) will not alter the structure of
wage-risk tradeoffs. Such differences are expected since, for example,
differences in education levels will lead to different labor market oppor-
tunities. What is of greater interest is whether the market offer curves
such as that in Figure 2.1 differ in their slopes. A definitive test that
Viscusi and Hersch (2001) propose for showing that labor market offer
curves differ in their wage-risk tradeoff opportunities is that if workers
who face greater risk levels receive less total wage compensation for
risk than do workers who face a smaller risk level, then they cannot be
on the same market offer curve.
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the Viscusi–Hersch labor
market model. The workers are in two groups, one of which faces the
offer curve w(p), and the other group faces the labor market offer curve
indicated in the figure by v(p). As in Figure 2.1, Workers 1 and 2 settle
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Fig. 4.1 The Viscusi–Hersch hedonic labor market model.
into positions along w(p). Worker 3 does not have the option of choosing
from this higher labor market offer curve and consequently must pick
the best of available choices from v(p). As indicated in the diagram,
Worker 3 chooses a job risk p2. However, that worker receives a lower
wage compensation for that risk than does Worker 2, who chooses the
same risk but from a more favorable labor market offer curve since w(p)
is steeper at p2 than is v(p). Thus, the difference w3(p2) − v(0) shown
in Figure 4.1 is smaller than the difference w2(p2) − w(0). What mat-
ters from the standpoint of VSL differences is not the vertical intercept
but whether the rate of tradeoff between money and risk also differs.
Thus, is the slope of v(p) flatter than that of w(p), as indicated in the
diagram?
In general we do not estimate all the different points along the curve
and compare them, but rather we obtain an average VSL number for a
particular sample. Suppose that one group of workers facing an average
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risk p2 receives a wage rate of w2(p2). Then that worker’s compensating
wage differential for the risk p2 is given by w2(p2) − w(0) and is shown
in Figure 4.1. In contrast, the workers who pick off the lower offer curve
on average receive a wage w3(p2) for the risk p2 and consequently earn
an average compensating wage differential w3(p2) − v(0). If workers
face identical average risks but receive higher total compensating wage
differentials for risk than does another worker group, then we can con-
clude that they are on a different wage offer curve. A stronger version
of this test is to compare workers at different risk levels. In particular,
if one worker group faces a lower risk p1, then their total compensating
differential for that risk should be lower than that for a worker group
that faces a higher risk p2. If this does not hold, then it clearly contra-
dicts the assumption that the workers are on the same labor market
offer curve.
To date there have been three studies that have analyzed whether
there are segmented labor markets from the standpoint of compensat-
ing wage differentials for risk. The first of these studies was Viscusi
and Hersch (2001), which focused on the difference between smokers
and nonsmokers. Because smokers incur substantial personal risks as a
consequence of their smoking behavior, one would expect them to be
willing to accept job risks for a lower wage premium than nonsmokers
and to gravitate to the higher risk, low wage-risk tradeoff jobs. Whether
smokers will simply be located further to the right on the flatter por-
tion of the market offer curve than nonsmokers or whether they will
be on different labor market offer curves is an empirical issue. What
they found in their analysis of job injury risks is that smokers faced
higher risks on the job than did nonsmokers, but they received a lower
wage premium for risk, providing evidence of different labor market
offer curves facing smokers and nonsmokers.1
This issue of labor market segmentation also arises with respect
to racial differences in compensation for risk. Viscusi (2003) analyzed
the compensating differentials faced by black and white workers in the
U.S. economy. While black workers faced greater risk than did whites,
1 However, in a sequel, Viscusi and Hersch (2008) consider fatality risks rather than injury
risks and do not find statistically significant differences between smokers’ and nonsmokers’
VSL amounts.
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they received lower wage premiums for risk. The same kind of proce-
dure described above for testing for different labor market offer curves
implied that the heterogeneity in the VSL levels observed across racial
groups could be traced to different labor market opportunities that
these groups faced.
A currently topical, policy-related example of this phenomenon is
with respect to the labor market role of immigrant workers. In par-
ticular, it is often suggested that recent immigrants perform the least
attractive jobs in the economy that nonimmigrant American workers
are unwilling to do. Translated into economic terms, such statements
imply that these immigrants have different rates of tradeoff between risk
and wages than do native U.S. workers. However, the welfare implica-
tions of these differences are quite different if immigrant workers face
different and less attractive wage offer curves than do native U.S. work-
ers rather than selecting jobs from similar market offer curves.
The potential importance of such heterogeneity is the focus of the
recent article by Hersch and Viscusi (2010a). Their analysis considered
a comprehensive set of U.S. immigrant groups. Notably, immigrants in
general often did not differ from native U.S. workers in terms of the risk
premiums they received. However, Mexican immigrants, particularly
those who lacked English language skills, fared particularly poorly in
the labor market.
Table 4.1 summarizes some of their results with respect to native
U.S. workers as compared to Mexican immigrants. The first set of
Table 4.1. Value of statistical life and immigrant status.
Fatality riska VSL ($2003, millions)
Estimates Based on the Current Population Survey (CPS)
Native U.S. 4.35 7.95
Mexican immigrants 5.97 Not statistically significant
Estimates Based on the New Immigrant Survey (NIS)
All immigrants 4.50 9.35
Mexican immigrants 5.70 Not statistically significant
Mexican immigrants who speak English 5.70 3.44
Source: Data are from Hersch and Viscusi (2010a).
aFatality risk is by industry-immigrant status-age using Census of Fatal Occupational
Injuries (CFOI) data. Fatality risk is annual fatality rate per 100,000 workers.
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results in Table 4.1 consists of estimates derived from the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). As indicated, Mexican immigrants face an aver-
age fatality risk on the job that is almost one and a half times that of
native U.S. workers. These fatality rate estimates are calculated using
the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) data conditional on
the worker’s industry, immigrant status, and age. Native U.S. workers
receive wage compensation for risk that implies a VSL of $7.95 million.
However, the fatality risk variable is not statistically significant in the
log wage equation for Mexican immigrants, indicating that they do not
receive statistically significant compensation for risk. Taken together,
these results provide evidence of labor market segmentation as hypoth-
esized in Figure 4.1.
A somewhat different comparison is provided in the lower panel in
Table 4.1 in which all immigrants are compared to Mexican immigrants
using data from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS). Immigrants gener-
ally face a risk level similar to that of native U.S. workers and, based
on the results from this study, have an average VSL of $9.35 million.
However, Mexican immigrants once again face a much higher risk level
and do not receive statistically significant compensation for the risk.
What these results indicate is that in analyses that seek to iden-
tify different types of heterogeneity in the VSL tradeoffs in the labor
market, it is essential to ascertain whether the groups do in fact face
similar labor market offer curves. How one interprets the observed het-
erogeneity in estimated VSL levels is quite different if the estimated
VSL is derived from selecting a different point from a particular wage
offer curve as opposed to the worker being relegated to a less attrac-
tive set of labor market opportunities with different available wage-risk
tradeoffs. If the differences in labor market opportunities arise from
influences such as discrimination, then whether and how one would
choose to use the estimated labor market estimates of VSL based on
the estimates across different groups will be affected as well.
Consequently, in instances of segmented labor markets there should
be further probing of the causes of differences in labor market opportu-
nities before incorporating the implications of any such heterogeneity in
policy assessments. One possible source of evidence is to use the results
of stated preference surveys or market-based imputations of VSL based
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on other choices not affected by labor market segmentation, such as the
price premium these groups are willing to pay for safer motor vehicles.
Not all individual differences lead to segmented labor markets. One
such case may be differences by gender. Women tend to face low
job fatality risks, making estimation of gender-specific VSL difficult.2
However, in an analysis of overall job injury risks, Hersch (1998) found
that female workers faced substantial hazards and also received signif-
icant compensating differentials for risk.
2 See Leeth and Ruser (2003) and Viscusi (2004).
5
Heterogeneity Based on Age
The VSL varies with individual age because the length of the remaining
life decreases with age, thus affecting the magnitude of what is at risk.
Expenditures to reduce the risk of death extend life expectancy but do
not lead to immortality. How the role of age influences the VSL depends
on various life-cycle effects. Changes in individual wealth and family
commitments over the life cycle affect one’s willingness to pay (WTP)
for risk reductions. In part, this life-cycle dependence of VSL arises
from imperfect capital markets that prevent people from borrowing
and lending money across time and from the inability to purchase life
insurance at actuarially fair rates. If we could draw on our expected
future lifetime earnings at birth, matters would be quite different. Such
a prospect for borrowing on future income would also create severe
moral hazard problems so that not offering this arrangement is not an
oversight by the insurance industry.
For over two decades, there have been numerous labor market stud-
ies of age differences and VSL. In the early studies in the literature,
the initial approach was to include in the wage equation an interaction
term of the fatality risk and the age variable. My series of studies with
Moore, such as Moore and Viscusi (1988b), include examples of this
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approach. Although the simplest models include only an age-fatality
risk interaction, other formulations that were estimated included the
expected life years lost based on the job risk and the worker’s age. Thus,
the models jointly estimated the worker’s rate of time preference and
the VSL. Some of these articles estimated various structural hedonic
models in Moore and Viscusi (1988b, 1990a,b) and Viscusi and Moore
(1989). The estimates based on these studies often yielded rates of time
preference that were sometimes in the 20% range, perhaps because the
studies used death risk data by industry and did not account for age
differences in risk. Age-specific fatality rates could not be constructed
using data available at that time.
While these studies found an average rate of time preference across
the labor market, this value depends on the worker group. Scharff and
Viscusi (2009) found that workers who are smokers have a much higher
rate of time preference with respect to years of life than do nonsmokers
based on estimates of the wage premiums for risk and workers’ average
implicit rates of time preference.
The recent spate of studies of the age-VSL relationship has been
enhanced by the availability of better job fatality data. The fatality risk
variable in early studies of age and VSL was not age-specific because
such data were not available. As a result, the degree of refinement that
was permitted by the data did not extend beyond estimating an average
value per statistical life year, based on the assumption that all workers
in an industry faced the same risk and all discounted years of life are
equally valued. More recent studies of the influence of age have taken
advantage of the additional refinement made possible by use of the
CFOI data. Using these data, which provide a comprehensive inventory
of all U.S. job-related fatalities, it is possible to construct age-specific
risk measures by industry, occupation, and other matters of interest.
The result of wage equation estimates using these measures is that the
age-VSL relationship reflects an inverted-U shaped pattern.1 However,
this shape is not symmetric as the upturn at early ages is steeper than
the downturn at later ages. This overall shape is consistent with the
implications of theoretical models in which the life-cycle pattern of VSL
1 See Smith et al. (2004), Viscusi and Aldy (2007), and Aldy and Viscusi (2007, 2008).
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is estimated based on an assumption of imperfect capital markets, as
in Shepard and Zeckhauser (1984).
Because of the role of imperfect capital markets, the life-cycle pat-
tern of income is instrumental in influencing the value of VSL at dif-
ferent age groups. In particular, the estimated VSL is flatter if one
controls for consumption over the life cycle or for cohort effects. The
pivotal role of life-cycle effects is borne out as the VSL shape over
workers’ lifetimes tracks the lifetime income and lifetime consumption
profiles quite closely, as demonstrated in Kniesner et al. (2006), who
use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in conjunction with
CFOI data.
The age variation in VSL is shown in Figure 5.1, which presents
estimates of the VSL by age group from Aldy and Viscusi (2008), who
use the CPS in conjunction with CFOI fatality rate data, which was
used to construct fatality rates by industry and age. The bold curve
indicates the cross-sectional estimates of VSL, whereas the dashed line
adjusts the VSL estimates, taking into account the particular cohort
that the individual is in. As is indicated, the cohort-adjusted VSL is
lower for younger age groups and higher for older age groups, reflecting
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Fig. 5.1 Cohort-adjusted and cross-section value of statistical life, 1993–2000.
Source: Aldy and Viscusi (2008).
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cohort. The peak estimate for the VSL for that study is just under $8
million in the cohort-adjusted estimates and occurs around age 50.
To summarize, what do we know about the age-VSL relationship
based on the labor market evidence?2 First, the VSL does not peak at
birth as would be the case if all that mattered is the total remaining
life expectancy. Second, the VSL does not plummet steadily as we age.
Notably, the VSL for workers around age 60 in Figure 5.1 is higher than
the VSL for workers around age 20. This result is not unique to this
particular study but rather is the norm in recent labor market analyses
of VSL, as in the study by Viscusi and Aldy (2007) and the review
of such studies by Aldy and Viscusi (2007). In particular, the VSL
represents the individual’s personal wage-risk tradeoff, which in turn
will be affected by one’s resources at that particular stage in the life
cycle. The total remaining life expectancy alone is not the sole factor
influencing the VSL estimate.
Recently economists have begun to explore the valuation of lives
outside of the labor market age range. Children are a prominent exam-
ple, where these valuations are derived from stated preference studies
of parents and other adults. Examples of such analyses are Hammitt
and Haninger (2010) and Blomquist et al. (2011).
2 The stated preference evidence on the age-VSL relationship is reviewed by Krupnick (2007)
and indicates a less pronounced pattern of age and VSL.
6
Value of a Statistical Life Year (VSLY)
6.1 The VSLY Approach
In many contexts, such as those involving regulations that affect people
with very short remaining life expectancy, it is not appropriate to use
the standard VSL measure. Rather, taking into account the difference
in longevity often leads to the use of the VSLY. The basic formula
for this method developed in Moore and Viscusi (1988b) divides the
VSL estimate by the discounted expected remaining years of life to
obtain the valuation per discounted expected life year. Their “quantity-
adjusted value of life” approach gave rise to what is now termed the
VSLY concept.
Although Moore and Viscusi present the VSLY formula in contin-
uous time, it is also instructive and simpler to consider the discrete
time analog. Let r equal the worker’s rate of interest used in discount-
ing years of life and L indicate the worker’s remaining life expectancy.
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or VSL equals the value of VSLY over an infinite remaining future
lifetime minus the value of life years beyond one’s future life expectancy.
Solving Equation 6.1 for VSLY yields
VSLY =
rVSL
[1 − (1 + r)−L] . (6.2)
Formulations such as this have been used to estimate an average
VSLY implied by VSL estimates coupled with values of L and esti-
mates of r.1
Whereas that article and several sequels have assumed a constant
valuation per year of life, the advent of more refined fatality risk data
makes it possible to construct measures of the industry and/or occu-
pational fatality rate for workers of different ages, greatly expanding
the kinds of analyses that can be undertaken. Viscusi and Aldy (2007),
Aldy and Viscusi (2008), and Viscusi and Hersch (2008) analyze VSL
and VSLY by age using a job fatality rate measure that is specific
to the worker’s industry as well as the worker’s age group. The esti-
mates derived from this approach imply that VSLY is not a constant
and is not steadily declining with age even though individual health
may decline. Rather, the VSLY rises fairly steadily before eventually
tapering off.
Figure 6.1 presents one such set of estimates from Aldy and Vis-
cusi (2008) using the CPS. Consider the cohort-adjusted VSLY esti-
mates indicated by the dashed lines in the figure. The VSLY rises from
about $125,000 for those in their late teens and reaches a peak of about
$400,000 around age 54. Thereafter, the VSLY tapers off but neverthe-
less remains quite substantial, at a level of $350,000 for workers age 62.
These results, in conjunction with those in Figure 5.1 for VSL, indicate
why the VSL does not plummet with age. Over the life cycle there is a
substantial rise in the valuation that people place on each year of life.
The source of this time variation can be traced to life-cycle changes in
income and consumption, which are examined below.
1 For a recent review of the VSLY literature see Hammitt (2007).















Fig. 6.1 Value of a statistical life-year based on cohort-adjusted and cross-section value of
statistical life, 1993–2000.
Source: Aldy and Viscusi (2008).
6.2 An Application of VSL and VSLY to the
Private Cost of Cigarettes
The VSL and VSLY estimates can be used in policy analyses in a vari-
ety of contexts. An illustrative application is that in Viscusi and Hersch
(2008), in which they estimate the VSL and VSLY specific to the indi-
vidual’s smoking status.2 Using the estimated VSL and VSLY statistics
for smokers and the associated lost life expectancy with smoking, they
calculate the private mortality cost per pack of cigarettes. This calcu-
lation assumed that years of life in retirement age have the same value
as years age 55–64.
The value of the private mortality costs varies considerably depend-
ing on the rate of time preference and the VSL. At a 3% rate of interest,
the cost per pack is on the order of $200 for men and $100 for women.
However, at smokers’ estimated labor market discount rate for years
of life at 14% (Scharff and Viscusi, 2009), the cost per pack drops to
$24 for men and $6 for women. At even higher rates of interest, such as
2 These results have since been replicated for Spain by Cobacho Tornel et al. (2010).
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those revealed in the labor market risk decisions by blue-collar workers,
the cost per pack decreases even further.
There are two key components pertinent to whether and to what
degree these mortality costs reflect private costs for the smoker. The
first component of interest is whether smokers fully understand the
length of life that will be lost due to smoking. Male smokers estimate
the life expectancy loss due to smoking as 8.6 years, and female smok-
ers estimate the loss at 13.2 years, each of which far exceeds the actual
estimated life expectancy loss.3 Thus, the perceived mortality effect
is quite large. However, the second component of the smoker’s calcu-
lation is the rate of time preference for years of life, which smokers
have shown through their job choices to be far higher than 3%. The
presence of a high rate of discount in conjunction with the high life
expectancy loss figures account for why smoking is nevertheless attrac-
tive to smokers. What these calculations also demonstrate is that the
main cost associated with cigarettes is the health loss to smokers, not
the financial externalities associated with smoking, which on balance
are negative. Even the positive financial externality components such
as medical costs due to smoking are under $1 per pack. Thus, these cal-
culations of the costs per pack provide no new information for smokers,
who already overestimate the mortality risk and life expectancy loss of
smoking. Rather, they translate the estimated life expectancy loss into
economic terms.4
3 See Viscusi (2002), p. 148.




Compensatory damages for wrongful death include as a standard com-
ponent compensation for the present value of the lost earnings that the
family experiences because of the death. While there may be adjust-
ments for taxes and consumption, depending on the particular state
law, the net result is that this component of compensatory damages
is proportional to the value of the income that is lost. In much the
same way, the WTP to decrease fatality risks is also likely to increase
with one’s income given that one’s health is a normal good. The main
empirical issue is how great the responsiveness is to the level of income.
The positive relationship between income and VSL is well estab-
lished both theoretically and empirically. The positive linkage was first
analyzed and estimated in Viscusi (1978b), who found the predicted
positive relationship. This relationship in turn spawned a series of stud-
ies of the effect of inordinately large regulatory expenditures on the lives
lost through the opportunity costs of these expenditures.1
More recently, there have been attempts to link the income elasticity
of VSL to measures of financial risk aversion in order to establish
1 One such study is that of Lutter et al. (1999).
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numerical estimates of the likely income elasticity range of VSL.
Kaplow (2005) has developed a model whereby VSL must be income
elastic for the VSL estimates to be consistent with existing estimates
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However, it should be noted
that the empirical evidence on risk aversion measures is quite sparse.
Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001) and Evans and Smith (2010) develop
similar models, but the relaxation of Kaplow’s assumptions by Evans
and Smith makes the theoretical relationships less clearcut. Resolving
the magnitude of the income elasticity of VSL is an empirical question.
There have been two principal estimation strategies that have been
used to assess the income elasticity of the VSL. The first consists of
meta analyses across different VSL studies. The meta-analysis approach
estimates the income elasticity based on how the VSL responds to
differences in the wage level in the studies. The component VSL values
are average estimates across each particular sample and consequently
do not reflect the full range of heterogeneity within the sample.
The meta-analysis estimates by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) yield an
elasticity estimate in the range of 0.51 to 0.61. Their study used a
series of ten different specifications that spanned all the possibilities
that have been considered in the previous VSL meta-analysis literature
by Liu et al. (1997), Miller (2000), Mrozek and Taylor (2002), and
Bowland and Beghin (2001). The estimates were not greatly sensitive
to the specification used.
An alternative approach to estimating the income elasticity of VSL
is to use quantile regression estimates within a single sample to analyze
how the VSL for workers at different wage levels differs depending on
the level of the fatality risk. A much more substantial estimate of the
income elasticity is reported in Kniesner et al. (2010), who use quantile
estimates using the PSID data on worker wages in conjunction with
CFOI fatality risk data by industry and age. They estimate a mean
income elasticity across the different quantiles of 1.44. As shown in
Table 3.1, the income elasticity varies substantially across the work-
ing population and across the different wage and income levels in the
population.
Although the equation specification used in this study parallels
that of a standard hedonic wage analysis, the resulting estimate of the
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income elasticity is quite different than that implied by meta analyses.
One possible explanation is that meta analyses may suppress evidence
of some income elasticity across the population because their focus is
on differences in the average VSL across studies, which does not fully
account for the within-study heterogeneity that is evident in the quan-
tile analysis. Notwithstanding these differences in the magnitude of the
income elasticity, it is clear that the value of the income elasticity of
VSL is positive and substantial.
The influential role of the positive income elasticity of VSL also
has ramifications for the age variations in VSL. Kniesner et al. (2006)
find that life-cycle consumption patterns are strong predictors of the
level of VSL. Indeed, the trajectory of VSL over the life cycle mirrors
the trajectory of life-cycle consumption. The strong income elasticity
of VSL at any point in time consequently has a powerful influence in
contributing to the observed life-cycle pattern of VSL.
8
The Advent of Using VSL in the Policy Arena
Although policy makers were initially reluctant to adopt the VSL
approach, this methodology has now become standard practice for
agencies in performing their regulatory analyses of risk regulations.
There have also been policy implications involving age adjustments
and income adjustments to VSL, and it is useful to explore how these
variations have been treated in policy assessments.
Before the advent of the use of the VSL methodology to value risks
to life in regulatory impact analyses, the government nevertheless did
attach a finite benefit value to these losses. Typically the approach
parallels that used in personal injury cases based on the present value
of lost earnings and medical costs. In its 1992 assessment of a pro-
posed hazard communication regulation, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) suggested that this human capital ben-
efit measure in fact calculated the “cost of death,” which the agency
regarded as less controversial than using the value of life methodology
because in its view, life is too sacred to value. After reviewing OSHA’s
regulatory impact analysis of its proposed hazard communication reg-
ulation, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concluded that
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the benefits did not exceed the costs. As a result, OMB rejected the
regulatory proposal.
OSHA then appealed the OMB decision to then Vice-President
Bush. I was asked to resolve the dispute between the two agencies by
analyzing the merits of the proposal as well as the OMB critique of it.
By using my estimates of the value of life, which has since been termed
the VSL, I showed that the benefits exceeded the costs. In particular,
use of my VSL estimates increase the value of the estimated benefits
by a factor of ten.1 As a result of this analysis, the regulation became
attractive on benefit-cost grounds. Calculated benefits now exceeded
the value of costs, and the day after the White House received my
report in support of the regulation, the regulation was issued.
What is particularly noteworthy about this case study is that in
this historical context, use of the VSL estimates approach was more
supportive of risk regulation than making lives “priceless.” Somewhat
surprisingly, the VSL methodology is now under attack for pricing lives.
However, at the time the VSL methodology was adopted the main
critique was not that the lives were being priced at too low an amount
but rather that the number was so large and so far in excess of the
present value of lost earnings that many questioned whether it was a
reasonable basis for benefit assessment.
1 My 1982 estimates used in this analysis were just over $3 million per expected life saved.
See Viscusi (1992) for further presentation of the analysis.
9
The “Senior Discount” Controversy
Although empirical evidence indicates that there are age variations
in VSL, whether and how these age variations should be taken into
account for purposes of benefit assessment are controversial. In its anal-
ysis of the Clear Skies Initiative in 2002, the U.S. EPA (2002) used
a senior discount of 37% in a benefits analysis sensitivity test. This
senior discount estimate was based on survey studies in the United
Kingdom by Jones-Lee et al. (1985) with respect to the public’s val-
uation of deaths from railroad accidents. EPA’s use of a lower valu-
ation figure for the lives saved for people over 65 led to a political
firestorm. Protesters adopted slogans such as “seniors on sale — 37%
off.”1 EPA subsequently backed off the approach. Although such demo-
graphic adjustments for age have evoked controversy with respect to
regulatory analyses, such adjustments for age and a variety of other
personal characteristics are the norm for calculating ex post compen-
sation in personal injury and wrongful death cases.
1 Representative news accounts are “EPA Drops Age-Based Cost Studies,” New York Times,
May 8, 2003; “EPA to Stop ‘Death Discount’ to Value New Regulations,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, May 9, 2003; and “Under Fire, EPA Drops the ‘Senior Death Discount,’ ” Washington
Post, May 13, 2003.
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The controversy over age adjustments did not abate even after EPA
abandoned this approach. Subsequently, Senator Barbara Boxer pro-
posed legislation banning all demographic adjustments to VSL. It is
important to note that this proposed prohibition against demographic
adjustments for differences in the VSL only pertained to differences at
a point in time rather than adjustments over time. Notably, under this
proposed legislation VSL would have been required to increase over
time as income levels rose.
Although there appears to be considerable resistance in the United
States for any downward adjustments to VSL based on age, is not
the case in other countries. As indicated previously there are interna-
tional precedents for such policies in both Canada and the European
Union. Canada has used a VSL that is 25% lower for those over 65
compared to those under 65, and in 2001 the European Commission
recommended that the VSL measure should have a declining value with
individual age.
While VSL estimates do not plummet with age, there are clearly
age-related variations in VSL. Moreover, use of age-specific VSL mea-
sures in some instances may boost the values placed on those who are
older as they have higher VSL amounts than do workers at the other
end of the age spectrum. Unfortunately, labor market evidence does
not provide information on the VSL magnitudes for those outside of
the labor market at both extremes of the age spectrum.
Suppose that to avoid controversy the objective is to value poli-
cies based on fairness instead of using the efficiency-based measure of
the VSL-age relationship. Adopting a fairness approach may not pro-
vide definitive guidance as it is not clear whether appeals to fairness
would resolve the controversy. One way of posing the fairness ques-
tion would be to ask whether using the same value per statistical life
for all age groups is equitable. That approach appears to have some
symmetry across different age groups and is certainly the kind of fair-
ness approach that the opponents of the senior discount incident would
favor. However, this approach places the same value on lives that are
very short as on lives that are very long. Consequently, each year of
life for older people is given a greater value than each year for younger
people. Alternatively, one might pose the fairness question in terms
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of whether having the same value per statistical life year is equitable.
Equalizing the VSLY across people is incompatible with using a uni-
form VSL number irrespective of a person’s life expectancy. A constant
VSL will create inequities by overvaluing the life years of those with
very short remaining life expectancy.
Such appeals to fairness consequently do not resolve the choice of
the appropriate age adjustment to VSL, as there are differing and quite
legitimate perspectives on what is fair. The main guidance should be
derived by returning to basic economic principles. In particular, the
guiding principle for any age adjustment should be to ascertain the
individual’s WTP for the risk reduction. This WTP value does in fact
vary with age and eventually declines with age. But the VSL is not a
steadily decreasing function of age and does not plummet with age.
10
Should Income Levels Matter?
While empirically there is a positive income elasticity of VSL, whether
income level differences should be taken into account for purposes of
regulatory analyses is seldom confronted by regulatory agencies. Use of
a uniform VSL irrespective of the income group targeted by the policy
will result in regulatory policies that the poor do not value given their
particular wage-risk tradeoff. If the cost of the policy will in fact be
shifted to this beneficiary group in some way, then from their vantage
point they will be made worse off by using a VSL that exceeds their
personal value.
A prominent example where the VSL-income relationship comes
into play is with respect to airline safety. In particular, should we reg-
ulate airline safety more stringently than highway safety given that
the passengers on airlines have a much higher income level than the
average person killed in an automobile accident? In a study prepared
for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that was subsequently
published as Viscusi (1993), I showed that, based on the respective
income levels of those being protected and available income elasticity
at the time, a higher VSL amount was pertinent for airplane fatalities
than for guardrails.
133
134 Should Income Levels Matter?
Although FAA did not adopt a positive income elasticity for VSL
at that time due to opposition from other branches of the agency that
regulated motor vehicles, matters changed in 2008. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (2008) became the first government agency to
formally adopt a positive income elasticity for VSL. Based on the Vis-
cusi and Aldy (2003) income elasticity estimates, the agency selected
an income elasticity value of 0.55, which was the midpoint of their esti-
mated income elasticity range. The U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion’s proposed adjustment of the VSL based on income levels is a very
bold policy initiative to account for within-population differences. If
the U.S. Department of Transportation subsequently uses these higher
numbers for valuing airline safety, then the rationale for doing so is
more compelling than in most policy contexts because the beneficiaries
of the safety regulation will bear the cost of the higher levels of safety
mandated by more stringent regulations.
In contrast, income changes over time have received much more
widespread support among federal agencies. In the nearer term, there
might be income adjustments to account for the fact that society
is gradually becoming more affluent, and the VSL numbers should
be updated to reflect changes in societal income levels. For analy-
ses pertaining to the more distant future, such as analyses of climate
change policies or similarly remote environmental problems, the income
changes involve future generations rather than those who are currently
alive. Making adjustments for differences in income is efficient. How-
ever, upward adjustments for future benefit valuations will redistribute
income from the poorer current generation to a more affluent future
generation, which some may view as inequitable. In response, climate
change adherents assert that global warming will make future genera-
tions worse off.
In their conceptualization of the proper role of income adjustments,
policy makers often fall prey to reference dependence effects. The cur-
rent VSL level serves as the reference point, and upward adjustments
are viewed much more favorably than are decreases. Proposed Senate
legislation in 2008 required that there be annual income adjustments
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for VSL based on changes in income.1 In keeping with this reference
dependence bias, the proposed legislation also stipulated that only
increases in VSL due to rises in income are permitted, and agencies
are required to make such adjustments. Decreases in VSL if income
levels decline are prohibited. Thus, even if there is a pertinent pos-
itive income elasticity of VSL and if income levels decline, perhaps
because of severe economic downturns, then the higher VSL value from
the more affluent period would be maintained. Similarly, improved eco-
nomic studies indicating that VSL had previously been overestimated
cannot be taken into account. There is no economic efficiency rationale
for such an asymmetry.
Such attempts to constrain the benefit values based on the political
acceptability of different kinds of benefit adjustments are inconsistent
with the fundamental principles underlying benefit-cost analysis. The
proper benefits measure should be grounded in the WTP of the bene-
ficiaries of the policy. Whether these individual preferences indicate a
positive income elasticity or other types of heterogeneity in preferences
does not invalidate the importance of adhering to reliance on individu-
als’ WTP for guidance in setting benefit levels. To impose constraints
on income adjustments or any other aspects of the benefit assessment
process in effect overrides individual preferences and the pivotal eco-
nomic role of consumer sovereignty.
1 “Restoring the Value of Every American in Environmental Decisions Act,” (proposed
110th Congress, 2nd Session).
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The Devaluation of Life Controversy
This kind of asymmetry in treating changes in the VSL amount is also
manifested in the devaluation of life controversy that emerged in 2008
with respect to the EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards’
(OAQPS) change in the VSL figure used in its regulatory analyses.1
This branch of the EPA based its update of the VSL amount on the
results of two meta analyses — Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and Vis-
cusi and Aldy (2003).2 Based on its assessment of the implications of
these analyses, the EPA Air Office lowered the VSL from $8 million
to $7 million. From an external vantage point, this downward shift in
the VSL presented an economic puzzle since income levels had risen
since the time that OAQPS had selected its previous VSL level. More-
over, the agency did not articulate why the studies differed or whether
the results of one of the studies were more credible and consequently
should serve as the basis for selecting the VSL. The studies are not
1 Viscusi (2009a) provides a comprehensive review of the controversy. The EPA SAB report
just before 2008 by Cropper et al. (2007) deals with a variety of pertinent VSL issues.




substitutes and take different approaches to their meta analysis. One
of the principal differences between the studies is that the Viscusi and
Aldy study used only the single best estimate of the VSL from each
study. In contrast, Mrozek and Taylor used all reported estimates,
which in some cases involved a very large number of different alter-
native econometric specifications based on the same underlying data.
However, by including multiple estimates from each study, the Mrozek
and Taylor analysis included observations that were not independent of
one another.3 At the extreme, if one were to include the VSL estimates
from all specifications reported in Viscusi (2004), then there would
be 80 observations drawn from different specifications using a single
data set.
Irrespective of the differences between the studies or whether the
downward shift in the VSL is warranted, it is clear that in general
agencies should have the freedom to reassess the scientific evidence
pertaining to the VSL and make whatever adjustments they believe are
appropriate even if doing so involves a decrease in the VSL. The public
reaction to the decrease in the VSL was less sympathetic. Substantial
political and public disapproval resulted as many suggested that this
devaluation of life was a conspiracy on part of the Bush Administration
to undermine regulatory policies. There is in fact no evidence that
there was any broader policy intent as the decision to lower VSL was
a decentralized decision within the EPA. Moreover, other branches of
the EPA, such as the Office of Water, did not decrease the VSL that
it used in its regulatory analyses. Ideally, if agencies have legitimate
reasons to alter their VSL, they should be permitted to either raise
or lower the value. The public furor that accompanied the devaluation
controversy did not delve into the rationale for the change in the VSL
figure, only with the direction of movement.
This devaluation of life controversy largely stimulated the draft
Senate legislation in fall 2008 that proposed that agencies must only
raise the VSL over time. What is particularly remarkable about this
incident is that it is the change in the VSL that generated the contro-
versy, not the level. Even with the downward adjustment to the VSL
3 Their econometric analysis did include a clustering adjustment for the standard errors.
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figure, the OAQPS number for valuing risk to life was still relatively
high compared to the value used by other federal regulatory agencies.
For example, OAQPS was taken to task for decreasing the VSL to
$7 million even though that figure exceeded the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s VSL estimate at that time by more than $1 million.
12
Adjustments for the Size of Risk
12.1 Risk Levels in Hedonic Wage Studies
Government estimates of VSL are based on analyses of tradeoffs involv-
ing very small risks. The chief source of evidence is labor market studies,
and these analyses pertain to risks that workers actually face rather
than very large hypothetical risks. Other hedonic studies, such as those
of housing markets and product markets, likewise are restricted to risk
levels that are observable. Stated preference studies have no such limi-
tation, but these analyses have generally focused on small risks as well.
A common policy question that has received attention from the EPA
Science Advisory Board and other agency groups is how these results
might be extrapolated to quite different risk levels.
Suppose that we know the shape of w(p) in Figure 12.1, or the
locus of estimated, observed risk-wage combinations that workers find
attractive. The market opportunities are generated by the offer curves
of different firms, such as OC1 and OC2 in the diagram. Armed with
the estimates of w(p), what can we say about workers’ willingness to
accept jobs with much larger risks than the small risk levels considered
in hedonic wage analyses? Consider Worker 1 who currently incurs a job
risk p1 at firm 1. If that risk level were increased to p2, then applying the
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Fig. 12.1 Hedonic market equilibrium for fatality risks.
results from the hedonic wage function w(p) would imply that Worker 1
would be willing to accept risk p2 if the wage were increased to w2(p2).
However, that wage level will not keep Worker 1 on the same constant
expected utility locus. A higher wage rate w1(p2) is required, where
this wage is necessarily greater than that implied by the hedonic wage
analysis due to the curvature of EU1.
By similar argument, one can analyze the worker’s WTP for large
risk reductions below p1. As a first approximation, one might wish
to assume that the curve w(p) approximates that value. However, as
is shown in Figure 12.1, EU1 lies above w(p) for risk levels smaller
than p1 so that the WTP values (or the drop in wages that workers are
willing to accept) for substantial decreases in fatality risk will be less
than those implied by the hedonic wage function.
Hedonic labor market studies of fatality risks of different magnitudes
will capture two sets of influences. First, because such wage studies
focus on willingness-to-accept (WTA) values for risk, as the risk levels
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Fig. 12.2 Relationship of value of statistical life to risk level in hedonic wage studies.
Source: Viscusi and Aldy (2003) based on six different studies of the relation of VSL to the
level of the risk.
become very large the wage-risk tradeoffs should increase as well for
any given worker. Second, people will sort in the labor market based
on their risk preferences, and the workers who are in very high risk
jobs have different preferences than those in more modest risk jobs.
Workers who self-select into high risk positions will tend to have lower
VSL values for any given risk level.
Figure 12.2 presents the Viscusi and Aldy (2003) results for the
VSL-risk relationship from six different hedonic wage studies that
included a quadratic risk term to capture the curvature of the w(p)
locus. Although the steepness of the decline in VSL with risk levels
varies with the particular study, in every instance there is a downward
sloping relationship. The dominant empirical influence is the sorting of
people with lower VSLs into high risk jobs. These w(p) curvature results
consequently provide little insight into any particular individual’s will-
ingness to accept large risk increases or their willingness to pay for large
risk decreases because the main factor driving market evidence on the
variation of VSL with risk levels is the influence of individual sorting
based on risk preferences, not changes in any particular individual’s
VSL tradeoff along a constant expected utility locus. Put somewhat
differently, these estimates capture the shape of the market offer curve
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rather than the shape of an individual’s constant expected utility locus.
Government agencies looking for guidance in valuing major shifts in
risk levels will have to rely on information beyond that conveyed by
the hedonic wage estimates.
The risk levels analyzed in the hedonic wage studies have varied over
time, in part because the workplace has become safer.1 The meaningful
risk measures are those that attempt to isolate the risk associated with
the worker’s particular job.2 The first such measures were those based
on the early U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) fatality risk data
by industry. The early BLS data are based on a sample of firms that
reported fatality statistics voluntarily. These risk data imply an average
risk level on the order of 1/10,000 for the time period beginning in the
1970s. The next wave of studies used data that were believed to be a
more comprehensive tally of workplace fatalities. The National Institute
of Occupational Safety and Health developed the National Traumatic
Occupational Fatality (NTOF) data, which reduced the amount of mea-
surement error in the fatality variable. Notwithstanding the name of the
data set, the information is available by industry and by state, but not
by occupation. The average risk levels in studies using these data are
from 1/10,000 to 4/10,000. Estimates using these data roughly doubled
the labor market estimates of VSL (Moore and Viscusi, 1988a).
The current gold standard for fatality risk data is the U.S. BLS
CFOI. This data base consists of a complete census of all occupational
fatalities rather than a sample. Each fatality is verified with multi-
ple source documents, with four being the average number of sources
used. The confidential micro data files can be used to construct risk
measures by industry, occupation, industry-occupation, age, gender,
1 Risk levels have also changed due to changes in job fatality data. The accuracy of these
data affect the influence of measurement error, which is explored in Moore and Viscusi
(1988a) and Black and Kniesner (2003).
2 The highest risk levels analyzed in the literature were in early studies that used the risk
information from the Society of Actuaries, for which the average annual risk of fatality is
1/1,000. These risk values are available by broad occupational group, but not by industry.
The large risk value is misleading, however, as the data do not distinguish the occupation-
specific risk but rather reflect the overall mortality risk from all causes associated with
people in particular occupations. For example, in these data, actors have a particularly
high risk, which is a reflection of their low income levels rather than any high job-related
risk.
12.2 A Calibration Example for Non-Incremental Risk Changes 143
race, immigrant status, or other matters of interest. The average annual
fatality risk level in the studies using these data is about 1/25,000.
While there are exceptions, for the most part the hedonic wage
literature has focused on WTA amounts for job risk levels averaging
from 1/25,000 to 4/10,000. By most standards, these are comparatively
small risks. For such small risk changes, the WTP amounts for EPA
benefit assessment should be fairly similar to the WTA amounts. As
indicated with respect to Figure 12.1, for larger nonincremental risk
changes, the estimated VSL from labor market studies will overstate
the implied VSL based on WTP amounts and understate the implied
VSL based on WTA amounts for large risk changes.
12.2 A Calibration Example for Non-Incremental
Risk Changes
If we have information on the shape of individual utility functions,
it is possible to analyze how the WTP amounts and WTA amounts
vary depending on the magnitude of the risk change. We begin with
the general formulation for VSL and then consider specific functional
forms. Let u(y) be the utility function of income y when healthy, and
let p be the probability of death. For simplicity, suppose that bequests
have a value of zero. Then VSL is given by
VSL = u(y)/[(1 − p)u′(y)]. (12.1)
Suppose that the utility function takes a logarithmic form u(y) =
a + ln(y). Such utility functions are specified up to a positive lin-
ear transformation, but the parameters must be set to be consistent
with the estimated VSL. Assume that VSL = $7 million and that the
worker faces an annual fatality risk of 1/10,000. Also let the value of
y = $27,200, which is roughly the current average annual wage income
of blue-collar workers in the CPS. This information is sufficient to pin
down the shape of the utility function.
Consider an order of magnitude increase in the size of the risk from
1/10,000 to 1/1,000. The associated risk change is 9/10,000. Based on
a VSL of $7 million, the estimated WTA amount would be $6,300. But
to keep the worker on the same constant expected utility locus, the
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required WTA is $6,966. Thus, the WTA is about 10 percent greater
than would be predicted based on the local rate of tradeoff implied by
the VSL. Similarly, the implied VSL for the discontinuous change in the
risk level by 9/10,000 is greater as well. The additional required wage
compensation implies a VSL of $7.7 million based on the WTA amount.
Large risk increases consequently generate a WTA value greater than
that implied by the estimated VSL from local tradeoffs, but the changes
in the valuations are not stark within this particular range.
Government policies generally involve WTP amounts for decreases
in risk rather than WTA values for risk increases. Suppose the starting
annual fatality risk is 1/1,000, the starting income is $27,200, and the
VSL based on local wage-risk tradeoffs is $7 million. Suppose the risk is
reduced to 1/10,000 so that there is a risk decrease of 9/10,000. Based
on an extrapolation from the estimated VSL, such a change would have
an associated WTP amount of $6,300. However, based on the WTP
amount that will put the worker on the same constant expected utility
locus, the WTP value is $5,825, which is 8 percent less than would
be predicted by the local tradeoff rate derived from the hedonic wage
relationship. The estimated VSL associated with this nonincremental
risk change is $6.5 million.
Large risk changes consequently have a different associated VSL
than implied by local rates of tradeoff, but the differences do not appear
to be stark. The implied VSL amounts for these shifts are greater
than the locally estimated VSLs from a WTA perspective and less
than locally estimated VSLs from a WTP perspective. For the risk
change amounts of 9/10,000 considered here, the WTA values were 10%
greater than predicted, and the WTP amounts were 8% lower than pre-
dicted. That the discrepancy should be greater for the WTA amounts
is expected given the curvature of the constant expected utility locus.
As can be seen from Figure 12.1, the curvature of EU1 ensures that the
WTP-magnitude of risk change relationship will be on a flatter portion
of the EU1 than the WTA-magnitude of risk change relationship. Thus,
to the extent that agencies are largely concerned with WTP estimates
more than WTA values, the change in the rate of money-risk trade-
offs with large changes in risk is less than would be the case for WTA
values.
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Fig. 12.3 Illustrative analysis of meta analyses.
An interesting application of the concern with the size of the risk
change is with respect to a VSL diagram that appeared in Appendix D
of the Review of the Revised Analytical Plan for EPA’s Second Prospec-
tive Analysis — Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 1990–2020,
Draft report, No. EPA-SABCOUNCIL-ACV-XXX-XX, March 5, 2004.
Figure 12.3 is drawn from that report. The risk-WTP combinations r1
through r5 indicate the observed results of hedonic wage studies being
pooled in a meta analysis. The counterpart VSL amounts for each of
these studies assuming a constant linear rate of tradeoff is indicated
by VSL-1 through VSL-5. The indicated WTP function in the diagram
indicates the estimated WTP function based on a meta analysis of the
five studies. Thus, the WTP value rises with the risk change based on
the pooling of results across studies and leads to a flatter WTP function
than that implied by linear extrapolation of any particular estimate.
What is potentially confusing about such discussions, which often
refer to labor market estimates as “empirical measures of WTP for risk
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reductions,” is that for hedonic labor market studies, the estimates
are not WTP measures but are WTA measures. In the case of stated
preference studies, WTP values are usually the reference point. From
a theoretical standpoint, for large risk increases the WTA should be
greater than the estimated value based on a linear extrapolation of
VSL levels. To the extent that labor market meta analyses are fitting
curves such as that in Figure 12.3, the implied VSL should be steadily
rising as the risk change increases. That the empirical estimates of VSL
do not increase with the level of the fatality risk is a consequence of
the self selection of different workers into high risk jobs, as shown in
Figure 12.2.
To avoid the complicating considerations of multiple studies across
different groups, Figure 12.4 from the EPA SAB report presents the
results based on a single study. Once again, WTP should be relabeled
WTA since WTA rises with larger positive changes in the risk as indi-
cated, but WTP declines. Interestingly, some EPA officials had sug-
gested that the VSL applied to benefit assessments for a large risk
decrease should be greater than for small risk changes. In effect, they
Fig. 12.4 Individual willingness to pay as function of risk level.
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got the relationship backwards, as does Figure 12.4. For large risk
decreases the WTP amount is less than the local VSL, and for large
risk increases the WTA amount is greater than the local VSL. In terms
of the policy application for regulations with large risk effects, it is the
WTP amount that is pertinent. Linear extrapolation of the estimated
VSL for large risk changes will overstate the WTP amounts for very
large changes in risk as people have a positive but diminishing WTP
for risk reductions. Whether these effects of major shifts in the risk
level are of practical consequence to EPA or other agencies depends on
the magnitude of the risks being considered.
Although some environmental risks are relatively large, with the
magnitude issue being of concern to the agency, whether they are par-
ticularly large compared to the labor market risks that form the basis
of most VSL studies is less obvious. For the labor market reference
point, consider the risk levels in the recent BLS CFOI data. These
annual fatality risks average 1/25,000, which is smaller than the risk
levels in other hedonic wage studies. As a result, focusing on these data
will provide an upper bound on the extent to which one should view
environmental risks as comparatively large.
EPA benefits assessments typically focus on lifetime risks rather
than annual risks. Assuming a 40 year work life, an annual occupa-
tional fatality risk of 1/25,000 corresponds to a lifetime job-related
mortality risk of 1.6/1,000. For a VSL of $7 million, the annual required
wage compensation is $280. The undiscounted lifetime wage premium
is $11,200. For benefit assessment purposes, such values should be dis-
counted using a reasonable discount rate such as 3%.
To apply my approach to an example of a large environmental risk
subject to EPA regulation, I used the Draft Benzene Case Study (EPA,
March 2008).3 This draft Clean Air Act regulation would reduce the
lifetime risks of leukemia to the exposed population. The high risk
county affected by the regulation is Brazoria County, for which EPA
estimates that the lifetime leukemia risk would decrease from 2/10,000
to 3 × 10−6. This risk change is two orders of magnitude, which is a
3 Data from the draft study are from the Memorandum from Daniel Axelrod to Alan Carlin,
National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. EPA, Nov. 17, 2008.
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large percentage risk change. But whether the decrease is two orders
of magnitude or even more is not the key issue for determining how
much one should modify the local estimate of VSL. The post-regulation
leukemia risk is about zero, but what matters is how much the absolute
level of the risk has changed.
The absolute magnitude of the lifetime risk reduction of approxi-
mately 2/10,000 is not completely outside the range of the annual risk
levels that have been considered in hedonic wage studies. How great the
risk probability reduction is depends on the nature of the risk exposure.
Suppose that the lifetime leukemia risk of 2/10,000 is based on a series
of exposures over a ten year period. Then the annual leukemia risk is
about 2/100,000. The CFOI annual risk of 1/25,000 is 4/100,000, which
is twice as great as this amount. Thus, even using the fatality risk data
series posing the smallest risk level, the leukemia risk reduction is of
fairly similar magnitude. If the lifetime risk exposure is the result of
exposures of even more than ten years, then the annual risk is even
smaller.
Whether the environmental risk reduction is large or small depends
on how the benefits question is framed. Knowing that there is a lifetime
risk reduction of a particular magnitude is not sufficient. Does the risk
arise from a one-time exposure that results in leukemia at a particular
future date? Or, more reasonably, does the risk arise from a series of
exposures over time that produces a future distribution of risk across
many future time periods? In all likelihood, focusing on the lifetime
risk overstates the risk reduction achieved by the policy in any given
year in much the same way as focusing on workers’ lifetime risks would
overstate their annual fatality risk level.
In the case of labor market risks, the wage compensation for risks
occurs in small annual amounts. Policies often do not involve annual
payments but instead may involve substantial fixed costs leading to
more costs being incurred up front. How the payment mechanism is
structured will matter for survey valuations. Most policies are not
in fact funded through actual payments of this type, so it is usu-
ally the publicly financed benefit valuation thought experiment that
is pertinent.
13
Latency and Cancer Benefit Issues
Leukemia and other cancer risks involve a substantial latency period.
From the standpoint of benefit assessment, the WTP for reducing these
risks at some future date should be discounted by a usual government
rate such as 3%. An alternative is to incorporate the latency period
aspect into a stated preference survey and ascertain individuals’ own
rates of time preference with respect to cancer. As fascinating as this
might be as an academic exercise, it is unlikely to provide meaningful
guidance for policy. Decisions involving an intertemporal component
are fraught with error. Among the problems identified in past studies is
that of hyperbolic discounting whereby individuals display inordinately
high rates of discount for the initial period, as shown in Viscusi et al.
(2008). Thus, estimated implicit rates of time preference may largely
reflect a form of individual irrationality. Decisions involving risk and
uncertainty are also potentially fraught with error so that combining a
latency period element with a risk valuation task may lead to an overly
complex stated preference task.
Even putting aside both the issues of latency and the magnitude
of the risk, more refinement of the benefit estimates for cancer risk
reduction is needed. The valuations of cancer risk reduction will differ
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depending on the type of cancer, the associated morbidity effects, and
the effect on premature mortality. Some stated preference studies of
cancer simply denote the disease as “cancer” with little description of
the health consequences. Such studies will not yield meaningful valu-
ations. Unless the respondent knows the characteristics of the health
risk being valued and the consequences for personal welfare, the com-
modity being valued may bear little relationship to what is needed for
benefit assessment.
The U.S. EPA (2010) provides a detailed review of the now sub-
stantial literature on cancer valuation. The U.S. EPA recommends a
50% cancer premium, as a “placeholder value,” which is in line with the
guidance of the Directorate — General Environment of the European
Commission.1 The U.K. Health and Safety Executive (2001) recom-
mends a value for cancer that is twice as great as the VSL for other
causes of death such as road fatalities.
The current U.K. guidance hypothesizes that there is potential het-
erogeneity in the valuation of a prevented fatality (VPF): “There is
evidence that individuals are not indifferent to the cause and circum-
stances of injury or fatality. For example, in their estimate of benefits
from asbestos proposals, HSE currently doubles the VPF figure to allow
for individual aversion to dying from cancer, and the additional per-
sonal and medical costs.”2 What is frequently ignored in reference to
the U.K. guidelines is the following footnote to this guidance: “There
is currently no evidence to support this adjustment. HSE has commis-
sioned a study to investigate public preferences for preventing fatalities
due to ‘dreaded’ risks to inform this issue.”3 Thus, the U.K. cancer
premium currently lacks an empirical foundation.
Two studies that have obtained cancer risk valuations after provid-
ing a detailed description of the health consequences are Magat et al.
(1996) and Van Houtven et al. (2008). Each of these studies used a
risk-risk methodology whereby respondents determined the personal
auto accident risk that would be equivalent to a given risk of cancer.
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/others/pdf/recommended interim values.pdf.
2 U.K. HM Treasury (2011), p. 62.
3 For example, the U.K. cancer premium is cited by the U.S. EPA (2010), p. 21, but with
no caveat regarding the absence of any empirical evidence for this premium.
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The Magat et al. (1996) study presented respondents with detailed
descriptions of the health effects of leukemia, where this health effects
profile was developed in conjunction with cancer specialists at the Duke
Medical Center. One would expect the studies to generate different val-
ues because of the different descriptions of the health consequences.
However, the extent of the differences between the cancer studies is
quite large. Magat et al. (1996) found cancer risks occurring with-
out any latency period as having a value equal to auto accident risks,
whereas Van Houtven et al. (2008) found that even with a 5 year latency
period, cancer risks were valued three times as highly as auto accident
risks. Other studies have yielded different results. Clearly, there is a
major research need to refine the estimates of cancer valuations.
The U.S. EPA (2010) has recently proposed attaching a substan-
tial premium to valuation of cancer deaths. Such a premium could be
warranted if the morbidity effects of cancer greatly outweigh the mor-
bidity effects of other causes of death, such as the acute risks captured
in the CFOI data. Because the mortality benefits from EPA regula-
tions almost invariably focus on cancer prevention, such a premium
will enhance the overall economic attractiveness of EPA regulations.
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Dread and Contextual Sources of Variation in
Valuing Life: Deaths from Attacks by Terrorists
How people die matters. Cancer is not the only potential health out-
come for which there may be a basis for adopting a different VSL. There
may be morbidity effects associated with different kinds of death that
will affect the valuation. In addition, the fatalities may be bundled with
other types of consequences so that what is valued is not the mortality
risk alone but also the risk in the particular context and the attendant
losses associated with it. These differences have led to valuations of
risks associated with dread, as in Chilton et al. (2006).
A prominent example of distinctive risks of death pertains to vic-
tims of terrorism. What is at stake with respect to terrorism risks are
not only the lives of the individuals affected but also the general idea
that the United States is under foreign attack. Such deaths evoke more
general concerns to pertaining to national defense, security, and our
overall vulnerability.
Risks of death consequently constitute an economic commodity with
a variety of bundled attributes. The nature of the morbidity effects
may be consequential, as with cancer, but there are also concerns with
respect to how the death occurs (e.g., a missile attack) and the terrorism
context in which the death occurs as well. Particularly when questions
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Subjective level of risk Percent Percent Percent
Below-average fatality risk 43.9 58.6 50.6
Average fatality risk 47.6 34.9 41.4
Above-average fatality risk 8.5 6.5 8.0
Source: Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006).
are posed with respect to the public’s valuation of risk, issues such
as national defense, national pride, and altruism with respect to the
prospective victims also come into play.
Because the valuations of reducing terrorism risks may be affected
by one’s perception of the risk, a useful starting point is to examine risk
beliefs regarding deaths from attacks by terrorists.1 Table 14.1 provided
the results from a national survey administered by Knowledge Networks
and analyzed in Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006). Respondents were given
background information on the number of U.S. deaths from auto fatal-
ities, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks. They were then asked
to rate their relative risk compared to the average American’s. Most
people tend to rate their risk levels as being average or below average
when compared to the general population. Doing so, in effect, enables
them to not find fault with themselves, particularly when elements of
personal choice are involved. Consistent with the framing effect of a
question format that generates an optimism bias response, few people
rate their risk exposure as being above average. Terrorism fatality risk
beliefs have a pattern not unlike other causes of death, as a large per-
centage of the population has below-average risk beliefs. The percent-
age of respondents in the below-average category is between that for
auto fatalities and natural disasters. Interestingly, auto fatality risks
have the lowest percentage with below-average risk beliefs, which is
inconsistent with the usual claim that people underestimate those risks
because of their apparent belief in their control over the risk.
The variables that influence these risk beliefs are examined in
Table 14.2,whichpresents the orderedprobit regressions for the terrorism
1 Robinson (2008) provides a review and recommendations for terrorism risk valuation.
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Table 14.2. Ordered probit regressions of the respondents’










More than 6 plane trips per year 0.545†
(0.296)
Source: Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006).
†Significant at 10% level, two-tailed test.
∗Significant at 5% level, two-tailed test.
∗∗Significant at 1% level, two-tailed test.
risk response. Variables that are not statistically significant, including
a comprehensive set of locational and demographic variables, are not
reported. The specter of the 9/11 attack apparently influences expecta-
tions as people who live in metropolitan areas or who fly more than six
plane trips per year have higher risk beliefs. Older respondents have lower
risk beliefs, while blacks have higher risk beliefs.
Should there be another terrorist attack, how willing are people to
support government relief of the victims and their families? For the
different terrorism risk belief categories shown in Table 14.1, support
for such aid ranges from 72% to 85% of the population. As indicated
in Table 14.3, among the more interesting factors linked to support of
assistance to terrorism attack victims are that current smokers, women,
blacks, and those with average terrorism risk beliefs are supportive of
such aid, while older respondents and Republicans are less supportive.
Although the 9/11 attack was a surprise to most Americans, a sub-
stantial share of the population claims that they knew about the risk
all along. This perceptional bias is a close relative of a form of hind-
sight bias that Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2005) term recollection bias.
Three samples of respondents in 2002, 2003, and 2004 were asked the
following question: “Take yourself back to the World Trade Center dis-
aster. Do you believe that the risk of a terrorist attack over the next
year on an airplane is higher or lower than you thought it was before
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Table 14.3. Ordered probit regressions for government
















More than 6 plane trips per year 0.356
(0.327)
Above-average terrorism fatality risk −0.643∗∗
(0.211)
Below-average terrorism fatality risk −0.408∗∗
(0.115)
Source: Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006).
†Significant at 10% level, two-tailed test.
∗Significant at 5% level, two-tailed test.
∗∗Significant at 1% level, two-tailed test.







Risk is now higher 43 54 33
Risk is same as before September 11 17 24 34
Risk is now lower 40 22 33
Source: Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2005).
the September 11th disaster?” Table 14.4 presents a summary of the
responses to this question. A surprisingly low percentage views the risk
as being higher than they thought it was before the attack despite
the likelihood that expectation of a terrorist attack was probably not
perceived as a significant risk before the 9/11 attack. This apparent
bias in risk perceptions has ramifications for the public’s support of
anti-terrorism measures as shown by results in a survey for tradeoffs
involving potential compromise of civil liberties. Respondents subject
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to September 11 recollection bias are less likely to favor targeting pas-
sengers for screening, presumably because they do not believe that
there is an enhanced threat that must be addressed.
Anti-terrorism policies also may entail tradeoffs borne by the indi-
vidual. Instead of targeting people for screening, there may be a choice
of waiting longer in line for screening. In this instance the tradeoff
is between civil liberties and waiting time. For scenarios in which
the screening was designed to only affect others, not the respondent,
the willingness to favor risk profiling based on personal characteristics
(“the person’s age, race, gender, national origin, appearance, and bag-
gage”) increased from 45% to 74% as the waiting time increased from 10
minutes to 60 minutes. As the regression results in Table 14.5 indicate,
each 10 minute period of waiting time increases the overall percentage
supporting targeting by 4%. Nonwhites, who may have been previous
victims of discrimination and who may believe that they will be tar-
geted, are 27% less likely to support a targeting policy.
To analyze different societal preferences toward reducing risks, Vis-
cusi (2009b) analyzed results of a stated preference experiment using
a nationally representative sample. The survey focused on two sets
of risk-risk tradeoffs. How much would one value the risks of death
from terrorism as compared to comparable risks from natural disasters?
How are terrorism risks valued compared to traffic-related deaths? And
Table 14.5. Determinants of the probability of favoring targeting of passengers for
airport screening.
Independent variable Coefficient (std. error)
Waiting time (in min.) 0.0038∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0022)




Waiting time × Respondent targeted for screening −0.0052∗
(0.0030)
Source: Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003).
∗Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at 10% level, two-sided test.
∗∗Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at 5% level, two-sided test.
∗∗∗Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% level, two-sided test.
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Sample Terrorism Question:
Suppose you can vote for one of two different policies that cost the same amount but reduce
different kinds of risks. Traffic safety policies reduce isolated deaths. The terrorism policy
prevents deaths from a single major attack. Which of the two policies would you prefer?
Traffic Safety Terrorism Policy
Type of Deaths Prevented Isolated Accidents Major Terrorism Attack
Average Number of Deaths Prevented 150 50
Which Policy would you prefer? Policy 1 Policy 2
Fig. 14.1 Example of risk tradeoff question.
Table 14.6. Relative risk valuations after accounting for risk beliefs.
Fatality risk tradeoff categories Implied relative valuations
Average disaster death risk/
average traffic death risk
1.7888
Above-average terrorism death risk/
average traffic death risk
0.6794
Average terrorism death risk/
average traffic death risk
0.9940
Below-average terrorism death risk/
average traffic death risk
1.3642
Above-average terrorism death risk/
average disaster death risk
0.3798
Average terrorism death risk/
average disaster death risk
0.5557
Below-average terrorism death risk/
average disaster death risk
0.7626
Source: Viscusi (2009b).
how are traffic-related deaths valued compared to natural disasters?
Figure 14.1 presents an example of such a survey question in which
terrorism deaths are compared to traffic-related risks.
The results of the series of paired comparisons based on questions
such as that in Figure 14.1 are reported in Table 14.6. A principal result
of the study is that although the number of deaths is the same in each
case, preventing 0.56 terrorism deaths is equivalent to preventing a
death from natural disasters for those with average risk beliefs. Thus,
respondents value terrorism risks by a factor that is more than double
the value attached to victims of natural disasters. Terrorism deaths are
valued almost the same as traffic-related deaths for those with average
risk beliefs. The different valuation amounts in Table 14.6 are quite
responsive to individuals’ risk beliefs, as the relative valuations are
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boosted by believing that one faces above average risks and reduced if
the risks are believed to be below average.
The high valuations of terrorism deaths compared to natural disas-
ters do not stem from a difference in risk perceptions whereby people
thought they might be victims of a terrorist attack but not a natural
disaster. The analysis controlled for differences in risk beliefs, personal
characteristics, and other factors likely to influence valuations. Politi-
cal factors also came into play, as those who are registered Republicans
placed a higher valuation on the terrorism risks even accounting for dif-
ferences in income levels and other likely determinants of the valuation
amounts.
While studies such as this provide evidence on a risk-money tradeoff,
their perspective is different than a traditional VSL study. A hedonic
labor market analysis of job market safety only captures the individ-
ual’s valuation of personal risks. In contrast, these stated preference
valuations yield society’s general valuation of the hazard, where this
value will include the personal risk but also may include a potentially
substantial altruistic component irrespective of whether one is at risk
personally.
The high valuation of terrorism risks as compared to traffic-related
risks is striking in that people are much more likely to view themselves
at a higher risk of personal death from motor-vehicle accidents, thus
leading to a strong personal risk valuation component as part of their
valuation response. The low valuation of natural disaster risks also may
stem from a belief that those exposed to the risk exhibit a form of moral
hazard. The analysis of attitudes towards victims of natural disasters in
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003) found that individuals who continued
to expose themselves to natural disasters after previously experienc-
ing catastrophic losses were not regarded as being highly deserving of
continued public assistance. However, the high valuation of prevent-
ing terrorist attacks from hand held missiles, as found by Smith et al.
(2009) suggests that there is a premium for terrorism deaths.
This kind of result pertaining to personal responsibility for risk
exposures very much parallels a finding in the United Kingdom by
Covey et al. (2010). Their U.K. study focused on the public’s valuation
of reducing risks of people who exhibit irresponsible behavior. The risk
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context they considered was that of railway trespassers and suicides
involving railroads. Their finding was that the public placed a lower
value on reducing the risks of life to those who were willing to expose
themselves to risk by, for example, intentionally being killed by an
oncoming train.
Both the U.S. natural disasters results and the U.K. railroad results
could reflect two sets of influences. First, people who have self-selected
into choosing risky pursuits by either continuing to expose themselves
to risks of natural disasters or taking high risk actions with respect to
railroad hazards have revealed through their actions that they place a
lower value on risks to their life. As a consequence, a lower societal value
for reducing their risks is simply a valuation that is consistent with
the person’s own revealed preferences and evidence of moral hazard.
Second, it is also possible that respondents view such risks as hazards
that will affect others and not necessarily themselves to the extent that
people believe that they are responsible risk takers even if others are
not. However, even accounting for differences in individual experiences
of natural disasters in Viscusi (2009b), there remains a substantial gap
in valuations of the risks of terrorism versus natural disasters.
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Should the VSL Be Added to the
Present Value of Economic Damages?
There have been efforts in legal contexts to use the VSL measure
to determine levels of compensation for wrongful death cases. This
approach, known as hedonic damages, has been rejected by most courts
but has been admitted in some state jurisdictions. To the extent that
compensatory damages serve an insurance function, setting compen-
sation amounts at the level of VSL provides excessive insurance. In
situations in which the injury arises in a market context, such as
product-related injuries addressed by product liability, compensation
based on the VSL levels will force people to buy excessive amounts of
insurance since the liability costs will be incorporated in the product
price. Use of VSL amounts in legal contexts is, however, appropriate
for determining the cost-risk tradeoff under a negligence standard or
for setting the level of punitive damages when deterrence is a matter
of concern, as shown in Hersch and Viscusi (2010b).
Notwithstanding economists’ reservations about using VSL as the
standard approach for setting compensatory damages amounts, Posner
and Sunstein (2005) advocate an even more generous compensatory
damages formulation than using VSL for wrongful death cases. Here
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I will briefly review their proposal and its limitations.1 Although the
focus of their discussion is the use of VSL in the courtroom, since the
optimal deterrence amount is never less than the optimal insurance
amount for wrongful death, their proposal has potential implications
for valuing government regulations as well.
The Posner–Sunstein proposal is to provide two different compo-
nents of compensatory damages. The first component is the standard
compensation for economic loss consisting of the present value of lost
earnings and medical costs. They propose as the second component
augmenting this compensation with the VSL amount. They describe
four different methods for calculating the VSL value. The four differ-
ent ways that they suggest for calculating the VSL are of potential
interest from the standpoint of analyzing the heterogeneity of VSL for
government policy. Irrespective of the method used to calculate the
VSL, their procedure ensures that the payment amount will provide
both excessive deterrence and excessive insurance. There is no sound
economic rationale for damages at the levels they propose, and they
do not offer such a rationale. In what appears to be enormous under-
statement, they observe that their proposal would “have a significant
impact on tort awards, especially for the elderly in non-hedonic loss
states.”
The first approach that the courts might use is to use to calcu-
late the government number for VSL. This is ultimately the approach
that they suggest that judges should adopt. Unlike the present value
of lost earnings and medical cost number, this VSL will not be spe-
cific to the individual and that person’s age, income, gender, health
status, and other factors. It is a one size fits all approach not unlike
what government agencies generally do when valuing regulatory poli-
cies. However, government policies are generally protective of broad
population groups, not single individuals. As a result, adopting a uni-
form VSL for compensatory damages for all wrongful death cases is
inconsistent with common law practices for setting compensation for
personal injury cases in which the compensation is linked to what the
particular injured party has lost. At a more fundamental level, there is
1 For a more extensive critique, see Viscusi (2007).
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also the question of what is the “government number” in that the VSL
number differs not only across agencies but also within agencies. For
example, air pollution and water pollution regulations by EPA are val-
ued at different VSL amounts. Note too that the government has never
adopted the VSL for purposes of compensation but only for benefit
assessment.
The second approach Posner and Sunstein suggest for ascertaining
the VSL is to determine the victim’s VSL. Thus if R is the compen-
sation the person received for risk q, the VSL amount that would be
used is R/q. Because the victim is deceased, a stated preference survey
asking the person the value of R for risk q is not feasible. The difficulty
with the person-specific attempt to ascertain the risk compensation R
is that rarely do we have individual-specific information on the level of
R or the value of q. Using the CFOI data it is often possible to estimate
the value of q for the worker’s industry-occupation cell or some other
basis, but not at the refined level of the individual’s job. Wage equation
estimates could also be used at an aggregative level so as to determine
the wage-risk tradeoff associated with the person’s job, assuming of
course that the individual who died was employed.
Their third approach to assessing the VSL for the deceased is to ask
how much the victim would have paid to avoid the risk and then infer
a VSL from that calculation. This procedure is a hypothetical calcula-
tion undertaken in hindsight on behalf of the person who is deceased.
One could use evidence from the person’s other risk-taking activities,
whether risks on the job or risky personal consumption activities such
as smoking, to make some inferences about the individual’s personal
VSL. However, from the standpoint of ascertaining VSL estimates that
reflect refined degrees of heterogeneity, this procedure appears to be
much less reliable than obtaining ex ante valuations using stated pref-
erence surveys. The temporal reference point for government policies
is also ex ante, which makes such an analysis feasible. However, the
court system compensates people after injuries and deaths so it does
not have leeway in this regard.
The fourth approach suggested by Posner and Sunstein for evaluat-
ing the VSL is to ask the jury to set a “value of life’s pleasures lost by
the victim.” This concept is entirely different from the VSL approach,
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although they suggest that it is simply an alternative procedure for
calculating VSL. The VSL reflects attitudes toward lotteries involving
small probabilities of death. The value of life’s pleasures is a quite dif-
ferent concept than that embodied in the VSL. The economic content
of the value of life’s pleasures concept is also not clear. Is this damages
amount the amount of money that the person must be paid after death
to be indifferent to life or death? Since the person does not have a
utility function after death, there is no operational significance to this
approach. Perhaps the task could be framed as the bequest amount that
would have restored the deceased’s welfare using the bequest function
of the deceased. Or perhaps another conceptualization for the value
of life’s pleasures is the WTP amount to avoid certain death. In either
case, the amount that is being calculated is quite different conceptually
from the VSL, and it is also unclear whether any of these formulations
is consistent with standard jury instructions.
Although the Posner–Sunstein proposal is not a workable approach
to setting damages for tort cases or for determining benefit values for
regulatory analyses, their discussion highlights the importance of rec-
ognizing the role of heterogeneity. Damages in wrongful death and per-
sonal injury cases generally are linked to the amounts that are lost
by the specific victims. Their approach abandons the traditional focus
of court awards on the losses in the particular case. The heterogene-
ity of these losses across victims is a central component of damages
calculations but is ignored by their proposal. In much the same way,
government regulations should be assessed using the specific benefit
values of those who are being protected by the regulation. Fortunately,
those protected often include a broad cross section of society not unlike
the U.S. working population so that applying labor market estimates
of VSL is often a reasonable form of benefits transfer.
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Conclusion
The VSL has been an integral part of the government’s benefits assess-
ment for almost 30 years. Much of the continued controversy created
by noneconomists over the approach has been based on the misun-
derstanding of the “economic” value of life. There is often a tendency
to equate this measure with accounting value such as the value of a
person’s taxes or income. The controversy and confusion has been so
great that Cameron (2008) has suggested abandoning the VSL termi-
nology. Because of this confusion, the opposition to the VSL approach
is often misguided. Fortunately, the VSL is likely to remain a standard
component of government analysts’ toolkit.
Throughout its history the use of the VSL approach has been quite
supportive of meaningful risk regulation policies. Thus, not only is it the
correct economic approach, but it also places a much more substantial
value on the lives that will be saved than did previous measures such as
the present value of lost earnings. Although some critics have proposed
that no dollar values be used at all, given the emphasis on showing that
the benefits of regulation exceed the value of the costs, the practical
consequence of this approach will not be to elevate their value but to
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diminish their importance in regulatory policymaking. Rather, treating
some risk reductions as “priceless” may make them “worthless.”
With improved fatality rate data and survey data, researchers have
greatly expanded the questions that can be addressed. No longer is
research limited to estimating an average VSL for the sample. The
estimates of heterogeneity of VSL and analyses of the sources of het-
erogeneity are becoming more refined both for the labor market and for
survey populations. A challenge raised by this increased refinement in
estimates of VSL heterogeneity is that there are new policy challenges
that are being presented. Should the policy effects be valued based on
the willingness to pay of those affected, as is the basic economic norm?
If that approach is to be followed, will it recognize the legitimate het-
erogeneity in these valuations? The task for policymakers is to decide
which estimates of VSL heterogeneity are meaningful reflections of dif-
ferences in individual preferences and which are not. Even if the VSL
estimates for different groups are valid, there is the subsequent issue of
whether they should be incorporated in the benefit assessment process.
For many broadly based government programs, average valuations will
suffice. But for policies affecting specific sub-populations, such as air-
line passengers, recognition of the heterogeneity of VSL is essential to
developing efficient risk policies.
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